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Abstract—Stakeholders’ security decisions play a fundamental role in determining security requirements, yet, little is currently
understood about how different stakeholder groups within an organisation approach security and the drivers and tacit biases
underpinning their decisions. We studied and contrasted the security decisions of three demographics—security experts, computer
scientists and managers—when playing a tabletop game that we designed and developed. The game tasks players with managing the
security of a cyber-physical environment while facing various threats. Analysis of 12 groups of players (4 groups in each of our
demographics) reveals strategies that repeat in particular demographics, e.g., managers and security experts generally favoring
technological solutions over personnel training, which computer scientists preferred. Surprisingly, security experts were not ipso facto
better players—in some cases, they made very questionable decisions—yet they showed a higher level of confidence in themselves.
We classified players’ decision-making processes, i.e., procedure-, experience-, scenario- or intuition-driven. We identified decision
patterns, both good practices and typical errors and pitfalls. Our game provides a requirements sandbox in which players can
experiment with security risks, learn about decision-making and its consequences, and reflect on their own perception of security.
Index Terms—Security decisions, security requirements, game, decision patterns
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
THE security of any system is a direct consequence ofstakeholders’ decisions regarding security requirements
and their relative prioritization. Such decisions are taken
with varying degrees of expertise in security. In some
organizations—particularly those with resources—these are
the preserve of computer (or information) security teams. In
others—typically smaller organizations—the computing
services team may be charged with the responsibility. Often
managers have a role to play as guardians of business tar-
gets and goals. Be it common workplace practices or strate-
gic decision making, security decisions underpin not only
the initial security requirements and their prioritization but
also the adaptation and evolution of these requirements as
new business or security contexts arise.
However, little is currently understood about how these
various demographics approach cyber security decisions
and the strategies and approaches that underpin those deci-
sions. What are the typical decision patterns, if any, the con-
sequences of such patterns and their impact (positive or
negative) on the security of the system in question? Nor is
there any substantial understanding of how the strategies
and decision patterns of these different groups contrast.
Is security expertise necessarily an advantage when making
security decisions in a given context? Answers to these
questions are key to understanding the “how” and “why”
behind security decision processes.
In this paper, we propose a tabletop game—Decisions
and Disruptions (D-D)1—as a means to investigate these
very questions. The game tasks a group of players with
managing the security of a small utility company while fac-
ing a variety of threats. The game provides a requirements
sandbox in which players can experiment with threats,
learn about decision making and its consequences, and
reflect on their own perception of risk. The game is inten-
tionally kept short—2 hours—and simple enough to be
played without prior training. A cyber-physical infrastruc-
ture, depicted through a Lego board, makes the game easy
to understand and accessible to players from varying back-
grounds and security expertise, without being too trivial a
setting for security experts. The particular setting of a utility
infrastructure is drawn from our prior experience of techni-
cal [26], [27] and non-technical investigations [28] as well as
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interviews with security experts, field engineers, IT users in
such settings [29].
Our work complements existing work on gamification as
a means to improve security awareness, education and
training [9], [13]. While there is a definite educational and
awareness-raising aspect to D-D (as noted consistently by
players in all our subject groups), our focus in this paper is
on contrasting the security decisions of the three demo-
graphics as they manifested in the game sessions. Existing
work, e.g., [20], has demonstrated such use of games as an
effective means to study decision processes of diverse stake-
holders. Specifically, the tangible, physical board enables
players to manipulate security features and observe the con-
sequences of their decisions. Recording and analysis of these
discussions and interactions provides a rich data source to
study their decision strategies, processes and patterns.
We report on insights gained from playing D-D with
43 players divided into homogeneous groups (group sizes
of 2-6 players): 4 groups of security experts, 4 groups of
non-technical managers and 4 groups of general com-
puter scientists. Such observations should, of course, not
be generalized, however, the substantial sample size ena-
bles in-depth qualitative analysis. Our analysis reveals a
number of novel insights regarding security decisions of
our three demographics:
 Strategies: Security experts had a strong interest in
advanced technological solutions and tended to
neglect intelligence gathering, to their own detri-
ment: some security expert teams achieved poor
results in the game. Managers, too, were technology-
driven and focused on data protection while neglect-
ing human factors more than other groups. Com-
puter scientists tended to balance human factors and
intelligence gathering with technical solutions, and
achieved the best results of the three demographics.
 Decision Processes: Technical experience significantly
changes the way players think. Teams with little tech-
nical experience had shallow, intuition-driven discus-
sions with few concrete arguments. Technical teams,
and the most experienced in particular, had much
richer debates, driven by concrete scenarios, anecdotes
from experience and procedural thinking. Security
experts showed a high confidence in their decisions—
despite some of them having bad consequences—
while the other groups tended to doubt their own
skills—evenwhen theywere playing good games.
 Patterns: A number of characteristic plays could be
identified, some good (balance between priorities,
open-mindedness and adapting strategies based on
inputs that challenge one’s pre-conceptions), some
bad (excessive focus on particular issues, confidence
in charismatic leaders), some ugly (“tunnel vision”
syndrome by over-confident players). We document
and discuss these patterns, showing the virtue of the
positive ones, discouraging the negative ones, and
inviting the readers to do their own introspection.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2,
we situate our work with respect to the literature on security
decisions and security games. Section 3 presents D-D, its
game model and rules. This is followed by a description of
our subject groups and the analysis approach used to study
their security decisions in Section 4. Section 5 presents the
strategies that drove decisions of various groups. Section 6
discusses whether groups’ (and particular demographics’)
approaches were procedure-, experience-, scenario- or
intuition-driven. Section 7 presents decision patterns—the
Good, the Bad and the Ugly—i.e., the patterns that yield bet-
ter results than others and the clear mistakes and pitfalls to
be avoided. Section 8 discusses threats to validity and limita-
tions of our study. Finally, we discuss the possibilities
offered byD-D beyond this particular experiment (Section 9).
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Security Decisions
A key challenge faced by any organization is the need for
optimal investment in security with respect to the threats it
is likely to face. Consequently, balancing various factors,
such as costs, against potential threats and their likelihood
is a key concern. One of the initial metrics for measuring
computer related risks was the Annual Loss Expectancy
(ALE), which was developed by the U.S.- National Bureau
of Standards in 1975 [17]. The ALE is an annual expected
financial loss to an organization’s information assets
because of a particular threat occurring within that same
calendar year. Several information security investment deci-
sion support methods have been proposed, e.g., [6], [12],
some of them based on the ALE metric, e.g., [21]. Within
D-D we aim to capture this realism of security decision-
making—balancing priorities between various threats and
investments is a key element in the gameplay.
Bodin et al. [5] introduced the Perceived Composite Risk
(PCR) approach. They used the Analytic Hierarchy Process
(AHP) to weight and combine different risk measures into a
single composite metric for risk analysis. This composite
metric supports decision-makers by capturing and balancing
the various risk measures that apply to their organization.
Baker et al. [4] proposed an event-chain risk management
model in which threats are “measured as rates per year and
then converted into outcomes by specifying the number or
extent per year.”While these works focus on providing deci-
sion support tools, the focus of our paper is to study and con-
trast such decisions between different demographics (with
varying levels of expertise and knowledge in security).
Research has also demonstrated that a better integration
is necessary between business and security perspectives.
Corriss [8] has shown that management usually considers
information security governance as under the jurisdiction of
their information technology department, separate from cor-
porate governance. Coles-Kemp et al. [7] have highlighted
the importance of relating security and business risk. They
showed that many businesses do not have the tools to relate
security risks to business risks and objectives, and that the
use of a facilitator can help them understand and better com-
municate security risks and help embed security manage-
ment into business practices. Similarly, Anderson [1] notes
that an important step to protect an organization’s data is for
managers to promote security awareness by “creating a cul-
ture where the community has the knowledge (what to do),
skill (how to do it), and attitude (desire to do it)”. These
works demonstrate the value of improving security aware-
ness, education and training while bridging corporate and
security cultures. The insights resulting from our study are
an important contribution in this direction.
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2.2 Games
Games have been used as research tools in various domains.
Space Fortress [10] is a video game that was developed by
cognitive psychologists to understand human cognition and
performance. The famous Tetris game has been used to
investigate the differences in the actions humans perform
from a cognitive perspective [15].
Military organizations and cyber security companies
have developed games to improve security awareness and
education. Although the form may differ (tabletop, role
playing, video game), they are based on a narrative similar
to D-D: players are placed in an immersive environment
where they must take decisions which require balancing
business and technical constraints. Examples include Cyber-
CIEGE [13]: a video game created by the US Naval Post-
graduate School that tasks players with managing an IT
organization, with the goal of maintaining user productivity
while investing resources in necessary security protections
against various attack scenarios. The Kaspersky Industrial
Protection Simulation is another example: a board role play-
ing game that defines itself as a “Security Monopoly” for
maximizing enterprise revenue while building an industrial
security capability and dealing with unexpected cyber
events despite uncertain information and limited resources.
Similar to model games such as miniature war games, D-
D provides players with a physical replication of the context
in appreciation: players are able to visualize and manipulate
elements of the infrastructure, which facilitates immersion.
Lego, in particular, has been used as a support for redesign-
ing the organization of an industrial facility [24] and for
teaching engineering principles [3].
Games have been used in education settings in numerous
knowledge areas. Examples in software engineering include
teaching software processes [18], [19], value-based software
engineering [14], software process risk management [25],
and requirements engineering good practices [23]. In [20], a
jigsaw puzzle-based game is used to perform analysis and
resolution of conflicts among stakeholders, showing how a
game can involve players into activities usually considered
boring or technical.
In the security domain, Beckers et al. [2] propose a game
to capture specific security requirements—in their case per-
taining to social engineering. In contrast, D-D focuses on
enabling stakeholders to manipulate security features and
observe the consequences of their decisions, leading to an
improved understanding of both security risks and the
trade-offs resulting from particular decisions. Control-Alt-
Hack [9] is a tabletop card game where players take on the
role of white-hat hackers. The evaluation suggests that
Control-Alt-Hack represents an effective model for dissemi-
nating ideas and encouraging interest in computer security.
Although the primary focus of this paper is on contrasting
security decisions of various groups, D-D also has a high
potential for educational purposes as discussed in Section 9.
3 D-D: THE RULES OF THE GAME
3.1 Overview
D-D is meant to be played by a team of 2 to 6 players,
under the direction of a Game Master. The players act as
the team in charge of cyber security in a small utility com-
pany, with the goal of minimizing security incidents. The
Game Master enforces the rules and guides the players
through the 4 rounds of the game. Each round—equivalent
to 2 months in game time—is composed of the following
steps:
1) The Game Master describes the state of the company
and the different systems in the infrastructure (cf.
Section 3.2).
2) The players are given a budget ($100,000) and a
number of possible defenses to invest in, such as fire-
walls, antivirus, threat assessment (cf. Section 3.3).
3) The players debate which defenses are more appro-
priate and decide by consensus where to invest their
budget.
4) The Game Master tells the players about the effects
of their investments: whether their defenses deflect
any attacks, and the effects of undefended attacks
(cf. Section 3.4). In addition to technical consequen-
ces, the share price of the company can be affected
by successful attacks.
3.2 The Game Board
The game board represents the players’ infrastructure (cf.
Figs. 1 and 2). It is composed of two parts: the field site (or
plant) and the office. The field site is where the industrial
process takes place. A couple of water turbines are con-
trolled by a SCADA controller, operated by local technicians
and engineers. A set of PCs used by local personnel and a
database collecting production data sit on the field site’s
network. This local network is connected to the Internet in
order to send strategic information to the office network,
where the CEO, a part of the engineering team, and the
human resources sit. The office network also hosts a number
of PCs, as well as a server and a database: the company runs
its own email service and website locally.
3.3 Defenses
Each round, the players are given a budget of $100,000 plus
any unspent money from the previous round. Initially, the
players can choose to invest among the defenses shown in
Table 1. When they choose to invest in an Asset Audit, the
Game Master uncovers additional defenses shown in
Table 2.
It is explained up to the players that the costs of defenses
in D-D do not reflect the actual costs of such defenses in
practice. Instead, they are designed so that, with a $100,000
budget per turn and a standard price of $30,000 per defense,
players can invest in 3 defenses each turn on average. Play-
ers must therefore prioritize their choices, hence enabling
the study of their security decision strategies and processes.
CCTV and Network Monitoring cost more ($50,000 each) to
give these defenses an aura of “advanced technology”, that
we later use to measure how much players are attracted to
sophisticated security solutions (cf. Section 5). Threat
Assessment and Encryption cost less ($20,000) for the sake
of game balance, as they are perceived as less powerful than
other defenses.
3.4 Attacks
Each round, the Game Master runs a number of attacks
against the players’ infrastructure, inspired by real-world
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threat reports [16], [22] and subsequently validated by the
security experts who played the game. Attacks are carried
out by three categories of attackers:
 Script kiddies using basic attacks (scans, DoS, phish-
ing, server exploits) on public targets (the company
web server and email addresses).
 Organized crime using more advanced techniques
(spear phishing, infected USB drives, infiltration via
an insecure wifi network) to achieve more advanced
goals (data exfiltration from the offices and plant,
ransom based on controller disruption).
 Nation states using the most advanced attacks to
exfiltrate technical data from the plant and disrupt
the controller.
If the players invest in a Threat Assessment, the Game
Master tells them about these three types of attackers and
the type of attacks and goals associated with them. Script
kiddies are “100 percent likely” to hit the company, Orga-
nized Crime attacks are “quite likely” whereas nation states
Fig. 2. The plant.
Fig. 1. Overview of the game board.
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attacks are “unlikely and nearly impossible to defend
against anyway”. The players are, therefore, encouraged
not to focus on high-profile attacks and to make sure that
the organization and its infrastructure is properly secure
against the most likely threats.
Each attacker follows a particular attack progression,
depicted in Table 3. It is important to note that the players
do not have access to this table: a Threat Assessment gives
them high-level information about the attackers, their meth-
ods and the associated likelihood, but no specific timings or
progressions. Most attacks are initially silent unless the
players have invested in the proper type of defense: for
instance, Network Scans go undetected unless Firewalls are
deployed, Phishing attacks are silently successful unless
Security Training has been purchased for employees. Visi-
ble attack effects hit the infrastructure when it is too late:
DoS attack paralyzing an un-firewalled server, viruses dis-
rupting PCs, or a ransom for releasing stolen data.
The attacks are designed so that low-level attacks (DoS,
simple virus by Script Kiddies at round 2 and 3) hit early to
assess whether the players invested in security essentials
against the most common threats. More sophisticated
attacks follow an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) life-
cycle. These attacks hit later (data exfiltration, controller dis-
ruption in round 4) to assess whether players can prioritize
between less frequent, sophisticated attacks and frequent,
low-level threats (Script Kiddies in rounds 1, 2). The effect
on the company’s share price is also proportional to the
sophistication of the attack: small bump when hit by a Script
Kiddie, significant dip when hit by Organized Crime (along
with mentions by the Game Master of press articles and
headlines in the news). The Nation State attacks are
revealed at the end of round 4 only, when the game finishes:
the Game Master then mentions to the players that they
were not expected to be able to defend against them.
The possibility of adding an element of randomness to
the attack scenarios was considered for its realism, but dis-
carded as it would have biased the comparison between ses-
sions, since groups would not have faced the same attacks.
3.5 Validation of the Game Model
The models of the company’s infrastructure and the attacks
targeting it are central elements that determine the game’s
realism and fairness. The cyber physical infrastructure must
include the essential elements of comparable real-life sys-
tems, despite the objective of making a simple game that
non-experts can play. The attack scenarios were designed to
be varied and representative of the current threat model for
industrial control systems [16], [22]. Table 3 includes attacks
of different natures—social engineering, cyber attacks,
physical attacks—and different degrees of sophistication.
This design choice favors players who are able to balance
priorities between these different vectors over players
focusing on a single type of threat: players are not rewarded
for guessing the one particular attack they should be con-
cerned with, but for identifying and countering as many dif-
ferent attacks as possible. From a study perspective, this
also allows us to capture a wide variety of strategies that we
can differentiate.
The infrastructure model was elaborated based on our
experience with industrial control systems. It was validated
by all the computer scientists and security experts who
played the game. The distribution of attacks took inspiration
from recent threat reports (e.g., [16], [22]) and was also vali-
dated by the security experts who played the game.
TABLE 1
Initial Defenses Available to the Players
CCTV - plant ($50,000) Surveillance cameras and alarms that will automatically warn security guards of a physi-
cal intrusion in the plant.
CCTV - offices ($50,000) Surveillance cameras and alarms that will automatically warn security guards of a physi-
cal intrusion in the offices.
Network monitor - plant ($50,000) An advanced software and hardware solution that monitors all traffic on the plant net-
work and detects ongoing attacks.
Network monitor - offices ($50,000) An advanced software and hardware solution that monitors all traffic on the office net-
work and detects ongoing attacks.
Firewall - plant ($30,000) A software and hardware solution that monitors and filters unauthorized traffic coming
from the Internet to the plant network.
Firewall - offices ($30,000) A software and hardware solution that monitors and filters unauthorized traffic coming
from the Internet to the office network.
Anti-virus ($30,000) A software protection against malware for all PCs (plant and offices).
Security Training ($30,000) Basic security hygiene for all employees (plant and offices).
Asset Audit ($30,000) Detailed evaluation of the company’s infrastructure, reveals and shuts down an open
wifi network on the plant, and unlocks additional defenses (cf. Table 2).
Threat Assessment ($20,000) Detailed information about possible threats and attacks against the company.
TABLE 2
Additional Defenses Available After an Asset Audit
Patches - Controller
($30,000)
Upgrade to the firmware of the
SCADA controller.
Patches - PCs ($30,000) Upgrade to the operating system
of all PCs (plant and offices).
Patches - Server & DBs
($30,000)
Upgrade to the operating system
of the server and databases (plant
and offices).
Encryption - PCs
($20,000)
Encryption for all PCs (plant and
offices).
Encryption - databases
($20,000)
Encryption for all databases (plant
and offices).
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3.6 Game Design Discussion
The balance between theme and mechanics was a key design
choice for D-D. The game was carefully designed in order
not to encourage a mechanics-based play (or, in role-playing
parlance, “meta-gaming”). The mechanics of the game are
kept to a strict minimum from a player perspective: 4
rounds, $100,000 budget per round, 15 defense cards and
the infrastructure are all the mechanics that they see. In par-
ticular, the players do not have access to the attack table,
with which they would be able to understand the mechanics
of the game and optimize their strategy accordingly.
Instead, players must base their decisions on the thematic
role of each defense and how they fit into the threat environ-
ment they are facing, which is entirely narrated.
This design choice is also enforced by the Game Master:
any meta-gaming attempt is discouraged. The Game Master
de-emphasizes game mechanics and asks the players to
focus instead on “what they would do in the real world”.
The rulebook provides guidelines for Game Masters to
encourage immersion and respond to players tempted by
meta-gaming. For instance, a typical meta-gaming behavior
would comprise second-guessing the Game Master (for
instance: “I bet the GM will run exactly the attack that we
won’t have defended against...”). As an answer, the Game
Master can emphasize that the attack scenarios are pre-
determined and mimick real-world conditions, recon-
structed from actual threat reports. In Section 8.1 we evalu-
ate whether players’ decisions are indeed based on
TABLE 3
Attacks Targeting the Infrastructure and the Corresponding Counters (Defenses) Noted  in the Table
Attacker Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
Scanning Kiddie Scan offices
 Firewall offices
Scan offices
 Firewall offices
Scan offices
 Firewall offices
Scan offices
 Firewall offices
DoSing Kiddie DoS offices
 Firewall offices
DoS offices
 Firewall offices
DoS offices
 Firewall offices
Hacking Kiddie Remote control server
 Server patch
Data exfiltration server
Net. mon. offices
 Encryption DB
Data exfiltration server
Net. mon. offices
 Encryption DB
Phishing Kiddie Phishing offices (trojan)
 Training
 Antivirus
 Patches PCs
Phishing offices (trojan)
 Training
 Antivirus
 Patches PCs
Phishing offices (trojan)
 Training
 Antivirus
 Patches PCs
Phishing offices (trojan)
 Training
 Antivirus
 Patches PCs
Malware Kiddie Disruption PC offices
 Training
 Antivirus
 Patches PCs
Disruption PC offices
 Training
 Antivirus
 Patches PCs
Disruption PC offices
 Training
 Antivirus
 Patches PCs
APT PC Offices Infected USB offices
 Training
 Antivirus
Remote Control PC
 Antivirus
Net. mon. offices
Data exfiltration PC
 Antivirus
 Encryption PCs
Net. mon. offices
Data exfiltration PC
 Antivirus
 Encryption PCs
Net. mon. offices
APT Server Offices Phishing office credentials
 Training
Remote Control Server
Net. mon. offices
Data exfiltration DB
Net. mon. offices
 Encryption DB
Data exfiltration DB
Net. mon. offices
 Encryption DB
APT DB Plant Vulnerable Wi-Fi plant
 Asset Audit
Remote Control DB plant
 Patch server
Net. mon. plant
Data exfiltration DB plant
Net. mon. plant
 Encryption DB
Data exfiltration DB plant
Net. mon. plant
 Encryption DB
APT Controller Scan plant
 Firewall plant
Remote control Controller
 Patch controller
 Firewall plant
Disruption controller
 Patch controller
Disruption controller
 Patch controller
State Intelligence Physical intrusion plant
 CCTV plant
0day DB plant
Net. mon. plant
Data exfiltration DB plant
Net. mon. plant
Data exfiltration DB plant
Net. mon. plant
State Disruption Physical intrusion plant
 CCTV plant
Remote control controller (0day) Disruption controller
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immersed, theme-driven thinking and to what extent do
they rely on mechanics-based optimization.
4 METHODOLOGY
We played D-D with a total of 43 players divided into 12
homogeneous groups:
 4 groups of “security experts” with a background
(i.e., skills, degree and/or professional experience)
in cyber-security.
 4 groups of “computer scientists” with a background
in computer science but not in cyber security.
 4 groups of “managers” with a management back-
ground and no skills in computer science or cyber-
security.
We ensured that our participants fell into these clear cate-
gories to avoid biasing the analysis. Therefore, when refer-
ring to players, “managers” or “computer scientists” refer
to the backgrounds described above instead of an actual
function. “Managers” were chosen as they play a major role
in decisions about security and budgets, and their back-
ground is identifiable.
The groups featured subjects from either academia or
industry, the former being either academics, PhD students,
postgraduate or undergraduate students in the correspond-
ing areas. We cannot reveal affiliations for ethical reasons,
but all “industry” players held a position or had previous
work experience in industry. Each group is given a unique
identifier shown in Table 5 (e.g., “CI2” for the second group
of computer scientists from industry). For consistency, all
games were run by the same Game Master with expertise in
both security and games.
We advertised game sessions on our universities’ mailing
lists, asking for volunteers, and we reached out to a number
of our industry partners. Group selection was organised on
a first-come first-served basis. A £10 compensation was
offered to students. An ethics agreement was signed,
guaranteeing the confidentiality of the study and of all per-
sonal statements recorded during the session. The record-
ings are kept in a secure, encrypted location. The transcripts
are anonymized and kept confidential. The project received
approval from the relevant ethics committee.
This experimental sample is substantial for a qualitative
analysis, much larger than existing literature on security
games (e.g., [9] is based on a survey of 14 educators and
observation of 11 players). We do not claim statistical signifi-
cance: the quantitative values reported are to ground our
qualitative insights and observations, in linewith the general
methodological approach taken in literature, e.g., [9], [23].
At the end of each round, the players were invited to
write a short report detailing their investments and a short
justification behind these. In addition to these logs of player
decisions, we video-recorded all sessions with informed
consent and transcribed them, then open-coded the tran-
scripts [11]. We analyze these two data sources using sev-
eral measurements as follows.
4.1 Game Score
To measure how well the players defended their infrastruc-
ture, we marked each game with a Game Score that counts
how many successful attacks the players successfully
defended. In itself, the game score is not an absolute mea-
surement of the security skills of the players: it is one indica-
tor that must be considered in the context of the other
qualitative observations that this study presents.
We considered a total of 33 attacks from Script Kiddies and
Organized Crime (cf. Table 3), each successful defense grant-
ing one point. State Attacks do not count as players should
not be trying to defend against such high-profile threats: for
instance, in round 1, defending a physical infiltration by a for-
eign spy with CCTV should not be considered a good play, as
it comes to the detriment of essential defenses against more
likely low-level threats. Fig. 3 shows the game score per
demographics. Computer scientists achieved the best results
as a demographic, manager teams had consistently average
results, whereas some teams of security experts ended up at
the bottom of the score sheet—surprising results that we
discuss inmore detail in Sections 6 and 7.
4.2 Measuring Player Strategies
During the game, a record is kept of all players’ investments,
round per round: this record is used to measure the players’
interest in different types of defenses (cf. Table 4). We assume
that the earlier players invest in a defense, themore important
this defense is to them. This assumption is clearly explained
to the players by the GameMaster: all defenses are useful and
their budget is limited, therefore they are invited to prioritize
the defenses they deem the most important for each round.
We partition defenses into four categories and associated
measurements that capture the interest of players:
1) Data protection: How much importance is given to
protecting the company’s data (e.g., in databases, PC
hard drives) from being stolen?
2) Intelligence gathering: How much importance is given
to evaluating the situation (threats, assets) before
investing in actual defenses?
3) Human factors: How much importance is given to
addressing human vulnerabilities (bad security prac-
tices, social engineering)?
4) Technological solutions: How much the players invest
in technological solutions, as opposed to the first three
categories? This category is further refined into three
sub-categories: physical security (i.e., CCTV against
physical intrusions), basic cyber security (essentials
such as firewalls, antivirus, security patches) and
advanced cyber security (highly sophisticated network
monitoring and intrusion detection).
To quantify the interest of players in defenses, we associ-
ate each defense with an Interest Score (IS) defined in Table 6.
For instance, if a team invests in an Antivirus in the first
round and a Security Training in round 3, the correspond-
ing Interest Scores for this team are:
ISðAntivirusÞ ¼ 4
ISðSecurityTrainingÞ ¼ 2:
The interest of players in the four categories of defenses
is then measured via the following scores:
 Data Protection Score (DPS)
DPS ¼ ISðEncryptionPCsÞþ
ISðEncryptionDBsÞ:
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 Intelligence Gathering Score (IGS)
IGS ¼ ISðAssetAuditÞ
þ ISðThreatAssessmentÞ:
 Human Factors Score (HFS)
HFS ¼ ISðSecurity TrainingÞ:
 Physical Security Score (PSS), Basic Cyber Security
Score (BCS) and Advanced Cyber Security Score
(ACS)
PSS ¼ ISðCCTV PlantÞ þ ISðCCTV OfficeÞ
BCS ¼ ISðFirewall PlantÞ þ ISðFirewall OfficeÞ
þ ISðAntivirusÞ þ ISðPatchesPCsÞ
þ ISðPatches Server&DBsÞ
þ ISðPatchesControllerÞ
TABLE 4
Detailed Investments by All Teams During the Game
Team Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
Asset_audit Firewall_plant Firewall_office Patches_PCs
SA1 Patches_controller Monitoring_office Training Patches_servers
Encryption_DBs CCTV_plant Antivirus
Encryption_PCs Monitoring_plant
Firewall_plant Antivirus Training Patches_servers
SA2 Firewall_office Monitoring_plant Monitoring_office CCTV_plant
Threat_assessment Encryption_DBs Asset_audit Patches_PCs
Threat_assessment Firewall_office Monitoring_office Antivirus
SI1 Asset_audit Patches_PCs Monitoring_plant Encryption_DBs
Firewall_plant Patches_servers Encryption_PCs
Training Patches_controller
Firewall_plant Patches_servers Monitoring_plant Monitoring_office
SI2 Asset_audit Antivirus CCTV_office CCTV_plant
Firewall_office Encryption_DBs
Training
Threat_assessment Asset_audit Patches_servers Monitoring_office
CA1 Firewall_office Antivirus Patches_controller Monitoring_plant
Firewall_plant Patches_PCs Encryption_PCs
Training Encryption_DBs
Threat_assessment Antivirus Patches_PCs CCTV_plant
CA2 Asset_audit Training Patches_controller CCTV_office
Encryption_DBs Firewall_office Monitoring_office
Firewall_plant
Threat_assessment Asset_audit Training Encryption_DBs
CI1 Firewall_office Patches_PCs CCTV_plant Patches_controller
Firewall_plant Patches_servers Monitoring_office Monitoring_plant
Antivirus
Threat_assessment Asset_audit Patches_PCs CCTV_plant
CI2 Training Patches_servers Patches_controller CCTV_office
Firewall_office Firewall_plant Monitoring_office
Encryption_DBs
Antivirus CCTV_plant Asset_audit Monitoring_plant
MA1 Firewall_office Monitoring_office Encryption_PCs Patches_servers
Firewall_plant Encryption_DBs Training
Patches_PCs
Threat_assessment Firewall_plant Monitoring_office Monitoring_plant
MA2 Asset_audit Antivirus Patches_controller CCTV_plant
Firewall_office Encryption_PCs Training
Encryption_DBs
Threat_assessment Asset_audit Encryption_DBs CCTV_office
MI1 Antivirus Firewall_plant Patches_controller Monitoring_plant
Firewall_office Patches_PCs Monitoring_office
Patches_servers
Threat_assessment Asset_audit Firewall_plant Monitoring_office
MI2 Antivirus Encryption_DBs Training Monitoring_plant
Firewall_office Patches_PCs Encryption_PCs
Patches_controller Patches_servers
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ACS ¼ ISðNetworkMonitoring PlantÞ
þ ISðNetworkMonitoringOfficeÞ:
Fig. 4 presents the measurements for each of these scores.
4.3 Characterizing Decision Processes
After measuring player strategies, we analyzed the decision
processes themselves via two indicators: the type and rich-
ness of the arguments players used and the players’ confi-
dence in their own decisions. These indicators were derived
while open-coding the transcripts [11]. More precisely, each
argument used by a participant is associated with one of the
following categories, presented by decreasing levels of
maturity:
 Procedure: a participant explicitly applies a methodo-
logical procedure. Example: “We should start with an
asset audit, then we can know what we are protecting and
invest accordingly.”
 Experience: a participant bases a decision on relevant
past experience with similar situations. Examples: “I
have never seen an IT infrastructure without a firewall.”,
“Remember the news last week? They got owned by a
phishing email, we should care about it.”
 Scenario: a participant invents a hypothetical sce-
nario, describing an attack or a potential situation,
to illustrate a point to other players. Example:
“What if someone got access to our database? We need
to encrypt it.”
 Intuition: a participant provides no additional evi-
dence but their gut instinct. In the absence of one of
the former justifications, this is the default code asso-
ciated with arguments. Example: “I like the antivirus.”
Fig. 5 shows, for each team, how many arguments were
used in each of these categories.
Measuring self-confidence follows a similar protocol:
each mention by participants of their confidence in their
decisions—either positive or negative—is coded. Examples:
“(To the Game Master:) you told us what we already knew.” (pos-
itive); “I don’t know, I’m not sure.” (negative). We then com-
puted the total number of positive and negative self-
evaluations. The results are shown in Fig. 6.
5 ANALYSIS OF PLAYER STRATEGIES
In this section we discuss player strategies in terms of prior-
ities in their investments (Fig. 4) and their efficiency with
respect to their game score (Fig. 3). In terms of background,
we can summarize player strategies with the following
tendencies:
 Security experts were strongly attracted byAdvanced
Cyber Protection and neglected Basic Cyber Protec-
tion and Intelligence Gathering.
 Computer scientists favored Intelligence Gathering
and Human Factors while being less interested in
Advanced Cyber Protection and Data Protection.
 Managers were technology-driven (Basic and Advan-
ced) and focused more on Data Protection than other
demographicswhile neglectingHuman Factors.
5.1 The Best Players Are Not the Ones You Think
Strikingly, security experts do not get better scores than the
other two categories while providing the two worst per-
formances of the panel (22 points for SA1 and 26 points for
SI1 in Fig. 3). Security experts were the most interested in
advanced cyber security solutions to the detriment of basic
protections (average ACS = 4 and average BCS = 13.5 in
Fig. 4). The discussions steered rapidly towards deploying
“big shiny boxes” (i.e., network monitoring) in all groups of
security experts. Interestingly, the most successful team of
security experts (SI2, with a Game Score of 29 in Fig. 3) did
not follow this tendency as much as other teams: they had
the lowest interest in Advanced Cyber Protection and the
highest interest in Basic Cyber Protection among all teams
of security experts (ACS = 3 and BCS = 15 in Fig. 4).
Security experts also tended to neglect intelligence gath-
ering and in particular to skip threat assessments (average
IGS = 5.5 in Fig. 4). A player from team SA1, who achieved
the lowest score of the panel, stated: “We are security experts,
we don’t need a threat assessment.”. Groups such as SI1 who
did invest in a threat assessment noted that they had learnt
little from it (“You told us what we already knew.”). However,
the detailed analysis of their decision processes (Section 7.3)
shows that they were not able to capitalize on the very
threat assessment they thought was obvious.
TABLE 5
Group Names and Player Distribution
Academia Industry
Security SA1 (4 PhD students) SI1 (4 consultants)
experts SA2 (3 undergr. stud.) SI2 (5 consultants)
Computer CA1 (2 academics) CI1 (6 IT engineers)
scientists CA2 (4 postgrad. stud.) CI2 (4 IT engineers)
Managers MA1 (3 postgrad. stud.) MI1 (2 managers)
MA2 (4 undergr. stud.) MI2 (2 managers)
TABLE 6
Definition of Interest Scores in Defenses
Round the defense is played 1st 2nd 3rd 4th never
Interest score for the defense 4 3 2 1 0
Fig. 3. Game scores (red cross = average).
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5.2 The Technology-Driven
Managers were technology-driven: they were the most con-
cerned with data protection (average DPS = 4.5 in Fig. 4)
while having strong interest in cyber protection, both basic
and advanced (average BCS = 8 and average ACS = 3.75
respectively in Fig. 4). This tendency is confirmed by in-
game reflections such as the following: “I really need to have
some software that can help me choose. I need some technical-
support.”. This technology focus comes at a price: managers
were the least concerned about Human Factors (average
HFS = 1.25 in Fig. 4)
It should be noted that, despite this surprising trust in tech-
nology over humanity, none of the teams of managers pro-
vided a bad performance. Their results were actually quite
regular, all teams scoring between 27 and 29 points (Fig. 3).
5.3 Balance Is a Key to Success
Computer scientists were overall the most interested in non-
technological defenses: they had the highest scores in
Human Factors (average HFS = 7.5 in Fig. 4) and Intelligence
Gathering (average IGS = 9 in Fig. 4). As summed up by a
player from CI2: “You need to see what the problems are before
you try and fix them.”. Computer scientists also showed a bias
against Advanced Cyber Solutions in favor of Basic Cyber
Solutions (average ACS = 1.75 and average BCS = 16 respec-
tively in Fig. 4), opposite to the strategy of security experts.
Finally, they were the least interested in Data Protection
(averageDPS = 3.75 in Fig. 4).
Such balanced, and not solely technology-driven, strate-
gies yielded good results: the best score of the 12 teams was
achieved by computer scientists (31 points for CI2 in Fig. 3)
while the other 3 teams had average scores (27 or 28). Over-
all, of the three demographics, the group of computer scien-
tists were the ones with the best results.
6 DECISION PROCESSES
Considering the way teams took their decisions, in terms
of arguments and self-evaluation, we identified two broad
behaviors, depending onwhether teams had both experience
Fig. 4. Detailed scores for each demographics (for clarity, only teams mentioned in the text are labeled).
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and technical knowledge or not. Interestingly, this classifica-
tion does not necessarily correlate with good results, as
shown in Section 5.
6.1 The Intuition-Driven n00bs
Team CA2 (computer science students) and the four teams
of managers (MA1 and MA2: management students, MI1
and MI2: industry managers) lacked either experience or a
technical background, and sometimes both. As a result,
their arguments were poor and mostly based on abstract
intuitions: “I think we should go for firewalls”, “I like the anti-
virus”. This was particularly clear for MA1 and MA2 (man-
agement students) and MI2 (junior managers): they barely
used any other form of argumentation, apart from a few
attack scenarios. Team CA2 (computer science students)
and MI1 (senior industry managers) used a higher propor-
tion of scenarios and even some procedural thinking, such
as “we should go first for an audit, then we will know what we
are protecting”. Notably, these two teams were also highly
self-critical, team MI1 scoring a record number of “I’m not
sure” and “I don’t know, what do you think?” in the transcripts.
6.2 The l33t (or Are They?)
Contrary to the previous category, security experts and expe-
rienced computer scientists mainly used rich, concrete sce-
narios to argue: “Imagine if someone compromised this box...”. A
clear difference can be seen between student groups (teams
SA1 and SA2: security students) and teams with more expe-
rience (teams SI1 and SI2: senior security consultants, CA1:
senior academics, CI1: junior IT engineers, CI2: senior IT
engineers). The latter used their experience of the field much
more by recalling past anecdotes. They also used procedural
thinking much more often, referring explicitly to initial intel-
ligence gathering before investing into any defenses. Proce-
dural thinking was not a guarantee of quality however: team
SI1, for instance, constantly referred to their initial threat
assessment but exclusively as a justification for a budget
increase, neglecting the actual content of this assessment and
the threats they were facing—this “tunnel vision” syndrome
is discussed in Section 7.3.
Security experts showed a high degree of confidence,
maybe due to a feeling of familiarity with security issues:
their self-evaluation counters are very low and feature more
positive mentions than other demographics. When realizing
that they had been hacked, the reaction of security experts
was in general to blame the lack of budget or complain that
they had been put in a very unfavorable situation. Com-
puter scientists and managers, on the other hand, acknowl-
edged their lack of expertise in security much more: teams
CA2 and MI1, for instance, were composed of highly self-
critical players. At the end of the game, they were much
more likely to acknowledge their mistakes; team CI2 was
actually surprised by their excellent result, as they were
constantly expecting a disaster to happen until the very end.
7 THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
The previous sections presented a number of patterns that
we observed in players’ decision processes: in terms of their
defensive focus, argument types and self-evaluations, and
the overall game scores of the different teams. This section
provides more detailed analysis of the transcripts, in order
to identify both positive decision patterns that yield better
results and mistakes the players made. We analyze several
transversal patterns (good, bad or ugly) that we illustrate
with characteristic plays. We invite the readers to be
inspired by the virtuous behaviors described in this catalog
and discourage bad habits (don’t try this at home!).
7.1 Balance Is Key (Good)
In D-D, finding a good balance between investments is criti-
cal to answer all threats appropriately. An inspiring exam-
ple is team CI2, a group of experienced computer scientists
from industry, who played a near-perfect game. The only
way the team could have reached a higher game score
would have been to skip the Threat Assessment (assuming
Fig. 6. Count of self-evaluation markers (no value means 0 markers were
available in the transcripts).
Fig. 5. Count of arguments in the transcripts.
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the participants already had the appropriate knowledge)
and to invest in an earlier Firewall, which would have
deflected an inconsequential scan on the plant during the
first round. A few characteristic features of this team:
 They were the only team to invest in a security train-
ing in round 1, deflecting 3 attacks at once (maxi-
mum Human Factors Score of 4, cf. Fig. 4). As one of
the players said: “You can have all the technology in the
world, if people are still going to click on a dodgy link in
an email...”.
 They correctly identified that the offices were more
exposed than the plant, due to the public server, and
prioritized their investments on this side (early office
firewall and server patch in rounds 1 and 2).
 They delayed less critical investments (controller
patch, CCTV) to later rounds while focusing explic-
itly on balancing their different defenses—technical
and non-technical, plant side and office side—
according to their evaluation of threats.
 The team had remarkably balanced discussions,
every player expressing diverging opinions. Despite
their experience, they were still self-critical (cf. self-
evaluation markers on Fig. 6) and were genuinely
impressed by their good performance at the end of
the game.
7.2 A Little Knowledge Is a Dangerous Thing (Bad)
Contrary to balanced approaches, excessive focus on partic-
ular threats leads to bad results. Team SA1 (security stu-
dents) provided the worst performance of all teams, in
terms of game score. They suffered from two major
weaknesses:
 The team had an enthusiastic attraction for high-level
threats: they invested straight into encryption for
databases and PCs, by fear of data exfiltration, fol-
lowed by a very early advanced technology—network
monitoring—during round 2 (their Data Protection
Score is the highest of all teams, cf. Fig. 4). Meanwhile,
their untrained personnel sitting in a non-firewalled
office with an unpatched server were hit by multiple
Script Kiddie attacks—trojan-infected email, denial of
service, compromised server—at the end of round 2
(low Basic Cyber Security Score, cf. Fig. 4).
 Despite their lack of experience, the team lacked self-
criticism, one of the players notably stating that “We
are security experts, we don’t need a threat assessment”
(their self-evaluation markers are predominantly
positive, cf. Fig. 6). Such a threat assessment would
have precisely shifted their attention towards more
likely low-level threats they finally cared about
when it was too late. At the end of the game, realiz-
ing how poorly they had played, one of the players
concluded: “Ignorance was bliss.”.
7.3 The “Tunnel Vision” Syndrome (Ugly)
When a team has strong pre-conceived assumptions about
security, these can drive their decisions regardless of any con-
tradictory information or feedback collected during the game.
Team SA1, described in the previous section, were clearly
affected by tunnel vision: their focus on data protection and
advanced cyber defenses left them vulnerable to many low-
level attacks. Team SI1, a group of engineers from a cyber
security consulting firm, suffered from a similar syndrome
and neglected data protection altogether, to a bitter end:
 The senior engineer of the group stated, at the begin-
ning of round 1, that “this company’s data has little
value: you could publish it all”.
 After investing in a threat assessment that described
a number of potential data exfiltration attacks, the
players signaled to the Game Master: “you told us
what we already knew.”. Yet they kept giving a very
low priority to data encryption.
 At the end of round 2, they were hit by a minor data
exfiltration attack, and still they did not change their
plans and delayed encryption investments in favor
of more protection against disruptive attacks. The
senior engineer explicitly said: “I don’t feel the encryp-
tion is any priority even though there has been a data
breach.”.
 It took two major data exfiltrations during round 3,
from both the plant and office databases, for the
players to concede that encryption was important:
they finally encrypted their databases during round
4, too late to stop ongoing attacks.
These two examples also show the risk of self-supported
expertise: these two teams of experts had high confidence
and little self-criticism. Therefore, they could not adapt to
unforeseen attacks despite the relevant information being
given to them. Interestingly, both of these teams expressed
contempt for non-experts, using the exact same expression:
“Users are idiots.”.
7.4 Beware of the Champion (for Better or for
Worse)
Although teams take decisions collectively, individuals had
a significant influence on the outcome of several games.
Champions supporting their ideas with strong arguments
were able to convince the rest of the team, for better or for
worse. Conversely, some players failed to become effective
champions for their cause and were silenced by stronger,
yet wrong, arguments:
 Team CI2 (the perfect runner) was implicitly led by a
senior engineer who pushed for an early security
training, then directed the team’s reflections accord-
ing to his (correct) assessment of the risks for the
infrastructure.
 One of the players in team SA1 (high-tech driven
worst scorers) tried to argue in favor of investing in
more basic defenses and considering human factors,
yet his voice was not heard by his teammates.
 Team SI1 (second worst scorers) suffered from a tun-
nel vision syndrome partly because the senior engi-
neer in the room disregarded the risks of data
exfiltration.
 Team SI2 (second best scorer) played quite similarly
to SI1, until one player with decades of experience in
information assurance managed to convince the team
to encrypt their databases, unknowingly preventing
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two catastrophic data exfiltration attacks—attacks
that did hit SI1.
Here, it should be noted that the Game Master ensured a
certain fairness during the debates by trying to balance
speaking times among players. In real-world contexts, some
less-vocal players would not have got the exposure they
were given during the game and their influence on their
team’s decisions would have been even weaker.
7.5 The Beginner’s Syndrome (Good)
A lack of experience can be compensated by open-minded-
ness and adaptability to the inputs provided by the game.
Opposite to some teams of security experts falling for their
pre-conceptions, all teams of managers and computer scien-
tists reached at least a relatively good score.
 Despite their lack of expertise, they were able to capi-
talize on information gathering: All non-expert
teams, MA1 excepted, went for an Asset Audit and
Threat Assessment during the first two rounds and
interpreted it correctly.
 They did not suffer from excessive tropisms that
could have put their defenses off-balance—such as
an immoderate focus on data protection (SA1), a
complete lack of consideration for data protection
(SI1) or high interest in advanced cyber solutions (all
security experts).
 They were constantly critical about themselves and
their approach to the game (cf. Fig. 6). Non-expert
teams particularly praised the game for its educa-
tional value, which is discussed in more detail in
Section 9.
8 THREATS TO VALIDITY
8.1 Influence of Game Mechanics
Players of a role-playing game such as D-D design their
strategy based on two factors:
 Mechanics, i.e., investing in the defenses they think
will optimally counter the game’s attack scenario, in
order to “win” the game.
 Theme, i.e., investing in the defenses they would
invest in if they were facing the same situation in the
real world.
D-D explicitly encourages theme-based play so that
player decisions reflect their understanding of real-world
security. In order to assess how theme-driven and how
mechanics-driven the players were, we asked them to jus-
tify each of their investments with a short written sentence.
We gathered 117 such justifications across the 12 games we
played, and we classified them as follows:
 109 theme-driven justifications that unambiguously
adopt an immersed, in-game perspective, for instance:
“We need to identify what we are protecting.” to justify an
Asset Audit, “Data is the brain of the company and it
shouldn’t be vulnerable.” to justify encrypting the
databases.
 5 mechanics-driven justifications that unambiguously
leverage a game mechanic, namely the round-based
structure of the game (for instance: “Can’t afford all
options on table - so do this first as gives benefit!! [sic]”) or
the attack scenarios (for instance: “[This defense is] more
likely to stop insider threat and nation-state than CCTV.”).
 3 ambiguous justifications that all refer to ongoing
attacks known by the players and for which we could
not clearly determinewhether the playerswere think-
ing in-game or meta-gaming, for instance: “Something
is going on in the office and we need to understand what.”.
Overall, 93 percent of the justifications relied on a theme-
driven strategy, which confirms that D-D does indeed
achieve its goal of immersing the players and recording
their real-world perception. In the future, we plan on study-
ing the influence of varying game mechanics, for instance,
by changing the price of defenses, changing the attack sce-
narios, changing the infrastructure.
8.2 Influence of Sample Size
Although our sample size is significant for a qualitative anal-
ysis, it is not so for a quantitative analysis. We ran t-tests to
assess whether there was a statistically significant difference
between the distributions of the 6 Defence Scores and the
Game Score for our three demographics. Results are shown
in Table 7. There are no statistically significant differences,
apart from two exceptions (out of 21 t-tests): security experts
and computer scientists differ significantly on their Advan-
cedCyber score (p-value 0:029 < 0:05), and computer scien-
tists and managers differ significantly on their Human score
(p-value 0:033 < 0:05). These results hold after correcting
for multiple testing, using Bonferroni correction. We do not
claim statistical significance, and future work will focus on
improving the statistical relevance of our results—namely
by collecting and analysing amuch larger set of games.
Another limitation of our approach is the lack of scalabil-
ity of our qualitative analysis. Transcribing, coding and
interpreting a single game transcript requires a significant
amount of manual work from several qualified researchers.
We are exploring potential ways of speeding up the analysis
phase. We are currently considering automating some parts
of it, for instance, via Natural Language Processing tools,
while preserving the in-depth understanding of player deci-
sion processes it provides.
9 D-D BEYOND THE EXPERIMENT
Beyond its utility as a semi-controlled environment for experi-
ments, D-D is intended to serve a number of purposes. All
TABLE 7
p-Values from Pairwise t-Tests Between Score Distributions from Different Demographics
Data BasicCyber AdvancedCyber Physical Human Intelligence Game Score
Security experts versus Computer scientists 0.545 0.121 0.029 1 0.359 0.164 0.254
Security experts versus Managers 0.780 0.218 0.134 0.791 0.076 0.774 0.327
Computer scientists versus Managers 0.284 1 0.155 0.767 0.033 0.427 0.660
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teams provided positive feedback after the game, although
different backgrounds appreciated different aspects of D-D.
9.1 Educational Training
Non-expert teams were extremely positive regarding the
educational value of the game. Several management students
reported to their teachers that they wished D-D had been
part of their regular curriculum, as it provided them with an
“informative and knowledgeable” introduction to cyber
security, IT infrastructures and decision making. Before the
game, players answered questions about their background
and their familiarity with IT, security and industrial control
systems (cf. Table 8). After the game they evaluated how
much they had learnt during the session about these topics
(cf. Table 9). As can be seen from the table, managers were
extremely positive regarding the educational value of D-D.
MakingD-D a full-fledged tabletop game that can be used for
educational purposes is themajor objective for futurework.
9.2 Corporate Practice and Communication
Industry participants in general were all interested in hav-
ing D-D played in their organization with mixed audiences:
for instance, having a CEO, a board director, a CISO and an
IT engineer play the game together to discover their differ-
ent cultures and build a common understanding of cyber
security. Participants with a governmental experience also
praised the informative qualities of the game. Several teams
made inquiries about future commercial versions of the
game and expressed interest in the results of our study.
Industry participants also praised D-D as a game: “very
enjoyable and well-constructed game” supported by a “nice
design” and a “good visual design” that delivered “good
fun” are some examples of the verbal and written feedback
provided by players. The board and its elements in particu-
lar were explicitly appreciated by players from all back-
grounds, as it provided a support for visualization and
helped focusing the debates.
9.3 Extending D-D
In terms of the future objectives for D-D, a number of exten-
sions to the game will be explored:
 A Game Master’s guide for building new infrastruc-
tures and attack scenarios. Such an extension could
increase the complexity of the game model so that
companies can replicate their own infrastructure and
threat environment for training purposes. This
would also allow the game to be played several
times by the same players in different settings (new
infrastructure, new attack vectors, new attackers,
new game objectives).
 A “red team versus blue team” version where a sepa-
rate teamof attackers is also given a budget and objec-
tives (“exfiltrate the HR data”, “disrupt the SCADA
controller”). The game then becomes an adversarial
challenge between two teams that must handle par-
tial information and anticipate their opponents’ next
move. This extension was particularly popular
among security experts and computer scientists: sev-
eral players informally asked to be registered for the
(potential future) tests of this extension.
 A software version that would allow single players
to play D-D individually, or several players to play
without the need for a Game Master. Removing the
Game Master would lead to a different experience
altogether, as the Game Master has a central role in
directing and interacting with the players, answering
their questions, providing additional information
and background, and ensuring fairness in their
debates. A software version, on the other hand, sacri-
fices this central human dimension for the sake of
portability and convenience: many players would be
able to play this version of the game with minimal
constraints and investments.
In order to catalyse the diffusion of D-D and encourage
the development of new versions of it, the rules of the game
have been made public under a Creative Commons licence.
They can be freely downloaded at: http://decisions-
disruptions.org
10 CONCLUSION
In today’s complex organizations and connected infrastruc-
tures, little is understood about security decisions and the
impact of various factors and biases behind them. It is
essential to promote cultural bridges that allow different
demographics to build a common understanding of the
TABLE 8
Pre-Session Background Assessment from Managers
(11 Players in Total)
Q: How would you rate your proficiency in computer sci-
ence?
No particular training 6
Some technical knowledge 3
Significant training or practice 2
Expert 0
Q: How would you rate your proficiency in cyber security?
No particular training 8
Some technical knowledge 2
Significant training or practice 1
Expert 0
Q: How familiar are you with industrial control systems?
Never heard the term before 5
Heard about it, but not sure what it is exactly 5
Familiar with it 1
Expert in the domain 0
TABLE 9
Post-Session Feedback from Managers (11 Players in Total)
Q: What did you learn about computer science?
Nothing 1
A few things 8
A lot 2
Q: What did you learn about cyber security?
Nothing 0
A few things 6
A lot 5
Q: What did you learn about industrial control systems?
Nothing 2
A few things 5
A lot 4
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“how” and “why” of the issues at play. In this paper, we
proposed Decisions & Disruptions, a game that allows par-
ticipants from various backgrounds to experiment with and
reflect on their approaches to security decisions. The analy-
sis of 12 games reveals several key insights:
 Strategic priorities and decision processes differed between
demographics: Security experts had a strong interest
in advanced technological solutions. They tended to
neglect intelligence gathering, due to strong self-
confidence in their knowledge and expertise. How-
ever, this self-confidence was often not balanced by
a willingness to reflect and critique their decisions.
Managers were also technology-driven and focused
on data protection while neglecting human factors.
Their debates were mostly driven by intuition but
did not lead to disastrous decisions. Computer
scientists tended to balance human factors and
intelligence gathering with technical solutions, and
demonstrated a strong willingness to question their
decisions. The above insights can be valuable when
conducting requirements gathering or prioritization
workshops with stakeholders from different back-
grounds within an organization—the requirements
engineer can be cognisant of these cultural biases
and, when such patterns manifest and take mitigat-
ing actions by exploring the rationale behind particu-
lar stakeholder decisions.
 Participants with a technical background and/or experi-
ence were not necessarily better players: Some teams
of confident but over-focused experts achieved
mediocre results, compared to inexperienced or non-
technical players who better adapted to the various
threats they were facing. Expertise was therefore
not necessarily successful unless it had the willing-
ness to question its pre-conceptions. This demon-
strates the importance of incorporating so-called
lay perspectives during security requirements
engineering—non-experts possess invaluable busi-
ness and operational knowledge that can contextual-
ize the security risks and decisions pertaining to
their mitigation.
 Various characteristic patterns and their influence on
security decisions manifested across the 12 games:
“balance is key” (good), “little knowledge” (bad),
“tunnel vision” (ugly), “beware of the champion”
(ambivalent), “beginner’s syndrome” (good). Such
patterns identify both good practices and typical
errors and pitfalls to be avoided. D-D can, therefore,
serve as a means for stakeholders to explore their
perceptions and understandings of security risks,
the trade-offs involved during decision-making and
the impact of such decisions on the security of the
overall system.
Beyond the scope of this particular experiment, we invite
readers to consider their own security decisions in the light
of our findings: Do any of these patterns sound familiar?
On which side of the spectrum does the reader belong? Pro-
moting good approaches and, above all, discouraging bad
habits and ugly mistakes is of paramount importance in a
world where cyber security is becoming a concern for
everyone. Through games such as D-D, one can experiment
with one’s own attitude towards cyber security, reflect as to
which patterns manifest in one’s decisions, and hopefully
end up on the good side of the spectrum.
Finally, D-D is a sandbox with clear educational value, as
consistently noted by our participants. The game provides a
didactic way of discovering cyber security for players with
varying degrees of expertise. In corporate environments,
D-D has the potential to become a strong communication
and awareness-raising tool that allows players from differ-
ent backgrounds—CEO, CISO, managers, IT engineers—to
sit around a table, build a common understanding of
security issues and bootstrap or consolidate their security
requirements.
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